No Bridge to India: Why Sri Lanka Rejected Land Connectivity

Sri Lanka's newly elected government, led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath, has firmly shut down a long-discussed proposal to construct a land bridge between Sri Lanka and India—a project that has often resurfaced in bilateral talks and development agendas. The decision signals a bold, nationalist shift in Colombo’s foreign policy that prioritizes sovereignty, political balance, and economic independence over regional integration, at least for now.

Bridge Plan Rejected Over Economic and Political Disparities

In a televised interview on April 25, Foreign Minister Herath addressed the simmering public debate around land connectivity. He clarified that India had not officially requested the project from the current administration, but that previous Sri Lankan governments, including that of former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, had expressed openness to such a link.

However, the new government is taking a different path.

“We are not Singapore and Malaysia,” Herath said, drawing a stark contrast. “They are politically and economically at par. We are not. We are a small country, and this project is not suitable for us right now.”

The proposed bridge would span the shallow Palk Strait, linking Rameshwaram in South India with Mannar in Northern Sri Lanka. While Indian advocates of the project highlight trade benefits, lower shipping costs, and revived historical ties, Colombo is more cautious.

Concerns Beyond Economics

The rejection is not merely about economic risk; it stems from a deeper concern over national identity, territorial integrity, and political autonomy.

Minister Herath explicitly raised fears that such a project, particularly when paired with an expressway linking Mannar to Trincomalee, could “physically separate” parts of the island—fueling division both geographically and socially. Trincomalee, a strategic eastern port city that India eyes for energy development, remains a sensitive spot in the country’s political landscape.

While Sri Lanka is open to an Indian-funded energy hub in Trincomalee, Herath stressed that maritime routes, not roads or bridges, are the appropriate way to access such infrastructure. “We need to consider territorial integrity more than the cost,” he stated.

Historical Suspicion and Nationalist Resistance

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Marxist party leading the current government, has historically opposed foreign, particularly Indian, involvement in Sri Lanka’s domestic affairs. That opposition intensified after the controversial Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 and the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the country’s north and east—events that JVP and many nationalists see as violations of sovereignty.

Although the party has moderated its position on Indian investments since coming to power, skepticism remains, especially regarding strategic infrastructure projects like the Adani wind farm or the proposed bridge.

Diplomatic sources suggest the JVP-led coalition views such ventures through a lens of power asymmetry: India is too economically and politically dominant, and therefore any connectivity could result in an imbalanced relationship—one that could pressure Sri Lanka into unfavorable positions.

Environmental and Security Implications

Beyond politics and economics, the bridge proposal also faces resistance from environmentalists and security experts. The Palk Strait is home to fragile marine ecosystems that could be threatened by large-scale construction. Moreover, open land access could intensify illegal migration, smuggling, and human trafficking—issues Sri Lanka already grapples with due to porous maritime borders.

Critics also warn that increased Indian access to Sri Lanka’s northern regions could undermine local employment and culture, especially in Tamil-majority areas still recovering from civil war trauma.

A Shift Toward Strategic Sovereignty

This firm rejection of land connectivity represents more than just opposition to a bridge—it’s a symbolic stand against perceived neocolonial influence and a recalibration of Sri Lanka’s external relationships. It underscores President Dissanayake’s commitment to maintaining a careful balance between development partnerships and national independence.

Still, observers note that the government isn’t turning its back on India entirely. Cooperation in energy, trade, and logistics continues—just not when it comes with what the administration perceives as geopolitical strings attached.

In the words of Minister Herath:

“We only proceed with what we, as a government, agree to. Not what others expect from us.”