How Sri Lankan plan on an IS attack blossomed forth from 2013!

How Sri Lankan plan on an IS attack blossomed forth from 2013!

How Sri Lankan plan on an IS attack blossomed forth from 2013!

How IS activities in Sri Lanka took shape from 2013 is revealed through the article titled 'First Intel on Lankans fighting with ISIS 2013' written by Nilmini Wijedasa. What appears below is a description about it. 

It is reported by now that Sri Lankans would be entering into a battle with (ISIS) Islamic government organisation and that the intelligence unit director board (DMI) of this country comes to know for the
first time from intelligence sources from Israel in 2013. It was mentioned that the intelligence director board was amazed by this revelation. However, it is only now that teams have been deployed to to be alert by monitoring those ISIS communication. ISIS Organisation publish a magazine by the name of Dabiq and a photograph of a person called Abu Shurayih As-Silani appears there. 

It was that name that was given to a 37 year old school principal who lived in Galewela by the name of Mohammed Mushin Garhas Nalim. Though he set off to Mecca in 2013, he never returned. It was Naleem's elder brother who had gone to Syria, it is learned. The mother, six children and the wife's mother and father and his wife's two brothers too left to Syria. 

Nalim's brother's daughter has got married to an Australian with Sri Lankan origin. This person called Arush had maintained connections with a person known as Abdul Latheef Mohammed Jameel. Before leaving the university of Swinburne in Melbourne in 2013 he has acquired a post-graduate degree. Initially, a crowd comprising 36 Sri Lankans of three families were living in Syria. Later that number exceeded 40. Naleem died from an air attack in 2015. Subsequently, Sri Lanka Intelligence were able to observe a number of more than 1515 using the social media ... giving support. In this instance the main role of activity was heralded by one Adhil, living in Aluthgama who was a wizard in computer. What he mostly publicised was software related to ISIS seeds. It was particularly used to transfer telegrammes. Making use of the space available even secret messages were transmitted. 

Like in that organisation, Adhil too was a young educated man. He turned into an extra-special character in the internet. According to what Intelligence units say is that basic or preliminary activities blossomed in that manner. Intelligence units managed to identify Sri Lankans who provided support to ISIS Organisation in Syria across those connections. While it was a very small crowd, it was actually not well organised. But they had studied Caliphate ideology ('Caliphwadaya') well. They constantly maintained inter-relationships with an imam in a Dehiwala mosque. 

Though it was so, he later on drifted away from their beliefs. They then stood up as a singular organisation. A person by the name of Umair living in Colombo 10 happened to give leadership to Jamadei Milaku Ibrahim (JMI) Organisation. These people who entertained thoughts different from other Muslims finally twisted into a crowd who did not wish to dismiss a compromising way of thinking. Some members wanted to migrate to Syria with their home-people. But after being determined to study Islamism and comprehend it, Umair changed his way of thinking. Affiliations with the two brothers Mohammed Ibrahim Ihami Ahamad and Mohammed Ibrahim Inshaf Ahamad Jameel who were combined in Easter Sunday bomb attack were developed because of business affairs and family attachments. Jameel's father on the other hand was engaged in a business by carrying on a shop in Old Moor Street, Colombo 12. The children became attached to each other across the parents and began to encourage them. They too maintained connections with Jamadesi Milathu Ibrahim Organisation (JMI). However, a discrepancy flared up Umair's faction and Jameel's faction. Under such conditions what Ibrahim's brothers did was to steal Jameel's data. What they believed was that something should be done within Sri Lanka. The JMI leader was against it. Jamadei Milathu Ibrahim was a new member of the organisation and subsequently, Mohammed Saharan Mohammed Caseem was introduced to the organisation. Sahran was accepted as someone who was compatible with his ideas. But as he was someone who came from the  East, others living in Colombo did not show much interest in him. 

Whatever it is, Saharan opposed Sri Lanka Thawheed Jamad Organisation and joined hands with the new National Thawheed Jamath  - NTD). Members of JMI wanted to publicise his sermons across social media. "He would extract texts from Quran and give an interpretation the way he wanted", a person who was involved in it said. After the clash in Kattankudy in the month of March, 2017 he disappeared. "As we now believe, Jameel maintained connections with the Ibrahim brothers. During that period of time, due to practical reasons, he was supported", he further mentioned. "What I think is that the Easter Sunday attack cannot be put down to the JMI or the NTJ. It's because the terrorist group detached itself from the main group. Saharan had only a few people. 

Though the Intelligence Unit were awake to these threats till end of 2016, political leadership did not show interest over ISIS. They even cared less about national security of Muslim extremists either. After the year 2009, the Intelligence network sounded a warning to the government about three post-war threats. The first was about the possibility that L.T.T.E. terrorism could raise its head once more. The second was Muslim extremism. (It shifted from from fourth priority). The third is human trafficking and narcotics or international crime. The fourth ... geopolitical political developments. Until 2015 Intelligence units combined with the ministry of defence and conducted committee meetings every Tuesday. Discussions were held at national security council every Wednesday. Thus, the frequency of holding meetings once every fortnight declined from 2016 onwards. The said meeting sometimes was conducted once every three weeks. What caught the attention most at those meetings the unfounded fear about the L.T.T.E. more than dangerous incidents which flared up recently. 

Our issue happens to be not entering the process of being alert about post conflicts surveillance without refraining from inquiring into weaponised mode; an official who attended council-meetings regarding national security of October 26th, 2013 said. Our security procedures directed itself to the weaponsised mode. It was of importance when L.T.T.E. attacked identified targets. In cases of threats of Muslim segments such as IS ... the enemy cannot be identified. We should now move towards an extra specially careful process. 

The Intelligence machine had to encounter another clash and that is the national mindset versus liberal mindset. In 2015, the director-board of the Intelligence co-ordinating committee made proposals to the political authority. Forwarding details about the present situation, information was forwarded about 3 processes of  alternate machinery as to how the relevant groups should go into action. One who could move with a person of authority. The second was introduction of rules and conditions to prevent terrorism. (In a background where terrorism springs up), the second is the combination approach. Internal avenues of information pointed this out this clearly. 

However, when governments changed they never were interested. National policies do not work together with liberal policies. In this area you can't have two fathers. There was a division right from the top. When thinking is divided ... action is divided. Even loyalties are divided and that was the biggest problem. 

A translation of the article: First intel on Lankans fighting with ISIS 2013 written by Nilmini Wijedasa published under Insight in Sunday Times 05/05/2019